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Introduction 
 
As part of the USAID/EGAT/NRM-funded Payments for Environmental Services (PES) Associate 
Award, regional reports on PES activities, with a focus primarily on watershed services, were developed 
for Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Ferraro, 2007; Huang and Upadhyaya, 2007; Southgate and Wunder, 
2007). This brief is a synthesis of the three regional reviews of Payments for Watershed Services (PWS). 
Payments for Watershed Services and PES are used somewhat interchangeably, but it should be 
recognized that PWS is actually a subset of PES where watershed services are at least one of the 
environmental services being targeted. This research brief provides an overview of the following 
PWS/PES issues if they could be characterized for the region: 
 
• Regional trends in PWS implementation.  
• Contexts and conditions that shape PWS and PES programs across the region. 
• PWS and PES program design elements. 
• Regional PWS program challenges. 
• Regional factors that influence PWS and PES programs. 
 
To describe PES, this brief adapts Wunder’s (2007) definition: 
  
1) There is a well-defined environmental service (e.g., specific changes in peak- or dry-season 
stream flow at the outlet of a watershed) or a suitable proxy for this service (e.g., hectares of 
forest conserved);  
2) There is at least one buyer of this service or proxy;  
3) There is at least one seller;  
4) Transactions between buyer(s) and seller/provider(s) are voluntary; and  
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5) Payments are conditional on contracted environmental services (or proxies for same) actually 
being supplied.  
 
Payments for watershed services in Latin America 
 
Payments for watershed services implementation remain incipient in Latin America, albeit much farther 
along than in any other part of the developing world. This analysis focuses on public policy, institutional 
factors, and political realities affecting PWS in Latin America. PWS programs featuring all five PES 
characteristics are rare in the Americas, even though the total number of PES or PES-like schemes (which 
satisfy most but not all of the five criteria) clearly exceeds numbers in Africa and Asia. One reason why 
conservation payments have been accepted more readily in Latin America appears to be that rural land 
tenure tends to be more secure in the region in terms of de facto control over resources. Without this 
control, users and owners of natural resources are in no position to be reliable suppliers of environmental 
services. Another reason is that commercializing rights to land use and land management practices is 
culturally and politically acceptable in much of the region. Major exceptions are parts of the Andes with 
large indigenous populations, as well as Venezuela. 
 
Among various stock-taking assessments of PES schemes, the most frequently cited is by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). IIED is 
currently updating its survey of watershed-focused schemes. National-level PES appraisals have been 
carried out by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and its partners for Bolivia 
(Robertson and Wunder, 2005), Colombia (Blanco et al., 2005), Venezuela (Blanco et al., 2006), and 
Vietnam (Wunder et al., 2005). A major finding of these appraisals is that few genuine PES initiatives 
have actually gotten off the ground: Some remained in the planning stage; others were abandoned before 
implementation. A large number developed into “PES-like” schemes that combine user payments with 
more conventional project approaches and included three or more PES elements. 
 
The Andes. Due to increasing water scarcity and upstream forest loss, there is a high potential for 
watershed PES in many parts of the Andes, where mountainous topography coincides in many places 
with large numbers of water consumers. Nevertheless, receptiveness to conservation payments varies. 
While some places are fairly open to market-based incentives for water management, others are not. 
Resistance sometimes has to do with a history of resource usurpation. Also, some people cannot reconcile 
the fact that water satisfies basic human needs with the reality that hydrologic resources are growing 
scarcer and hence more marketable – or even that channeling water from its sources to the places where it 
is consumed is not free, therefore must be financed by either consumers or others. In societies with a 
strong indigenous culture (e.g., the Bolivian highlands), PES development tends to lag. The same holds 
for large, closed economies, such as Venezuela. 
 
Incentives are strong in Bolivia to protect watersheds as well as the amenity resources harnessed for 
ecotourism. However, skepticism is widespread toward the “neoliberal” approach to natural resource 
management generally and PES specifically. Related to this skepticism are suspicions of disguised 
privatization of public-access resources, including water. Furthermore, key preconditions for PES, such as 
secure land tenure, are still lacking in many places. As a result, most conservation initiatives are properly 
categorized as customary projects. One PES-like pioneer has been the Noel Kempff project, combining 
carbon and biodiversity services to protect a forest area threatened by logging, near the Brazilian border. 
Among the few genuine PES schemes in Bolivia is a small project administered by Fundación Natura, in 
the buffer zone of Amboró National Park, where irrigator and biodiversity payments are pooled to finance 
conservation (Asquith et al., forthcoming). Opportunities to use the same approach are more promising in 
the Andean foothills and the transition to Bolivia’s lowlands (Media Luna), where there is less ideological 
resistance to economic instruments and where irrigated, commercial agriculture and urban water 
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consumers are potential buyers. Various municipalities in Tarija and Santa Cruz are also experimenting 
with PES-like watershed schemes (Robertson and Wunder, 2005). 
 
Experimentation with PES has been less in Peru than in Bolivia. No projects for carbon sequestration 
appear to be running, although some are in preparation. As for watershed schemes, the most serious 
efforts have been in Alto Mayo-Moyobamba, San Martín Department, and in the Jequelepeque and Piura 
watersheds, where German GTZ and CONDESAN have been working together in the Andean 
Watersheds Project (Veen, 2007). While negotiation processes have advanced noticeably, a primary 
obstacle has been to transform willingness to pay on the part of potential service buyers into actual 
monetary flows (A. Moreno-Díaz, personal communication, January 2007). 
 
No South American nation has a richer PES portfolio than Ecuador, where ideological hostility to 
conservation payments is less than in Bolivia and Peru. Two pioneer schemes that fit the five-point PES 
definition completely have been running for years. One is the PROFAFOR carbon sequestration program, 
which has been operating for a decade (Albán and Argüello, 2002). The other is the Pimampiro municipal 
watershed scheme. These programs have inspired a new generation of local, self-organized PES schemes, 
including a municipal watershed project in Celica (Loja Province). Another type of scheme draws on 
water funds to which customers contribute to finance watershed conservation. However, these funds, 
which have been established in Quito, Cuenca, and El Angel, finance conservation projects rather than 
make payments to private providers of environmental services. 
 
Colombia is probably the most advanced Latin American country in terms of creating innovative 
mechanisms for the financing of conservation. While charging users of environmental services has 
become widespread in the country, compensating service providers on the ground is still less advanced 
than in Ecuador. However, many more pilots exist than in the Southern Andes and Venezuela, ranging 
from the NGO CIPAV’s RISEMP silvopastural project for biodiversity and carbon (now extended to 
watershed services), to PES-like irrigator payments for upstream projects in the Cauca Valley, 
PROCUENCA’s water user-financed reforestation in Manizales, and recent water-user payments to 
upstream protection in Chaina near Villa de Leyva. A number of other relatively advanced initiatives 
exist, and a national PES strategy is being prepared that may well give Colombia a leading role in PES 
implementation in the region.   
 
No genuine PES schemes exist in Venezuela, but in at least one case (La Jabonosa watershed, Táchira) 
water-user payments are being used for projects, and PES trials are being considered. Hydroelectric 
payments from the Guri dam have been used for financing fire and deforestation surveillance in Canaima 
National Park. One preexisting national program, Subsidio Conservacionista, constitutes a potential legal 
framework for PES.  
 
In summary, PES in the Andean region is uneven, with Ecuador and Colombia more advanced than 
Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela. Some of this variation traces to political-ideological factors. Watershed 
services clearly dominate other services and demand for the former is on the rise. Other than some trial 
initiatives in Colombia, all existing schemes are self-organized by buyers, sellers, and intermediaries, 
with little involvement by the central state. Basically all schemes are bilaterally negotiated deals – not 
quite markets in which environmental services are bought and sold continually. 
 
Little PES activity has occurred in the Amazon. Payments have been collected from tourism operators in 
Peru’s Madre de Dios region to finance the conservation of scenic vistas (Veen, 2007). A similar scheme 
exists in Bolivia’s Madidi National Park (Robertson and Wunder, 2005). However, the specific mechanics 
of these initiatives differ from those of pure PES (Ferraro and Simpson, 2005). There has been little 
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interest in the Amazon in payment for hydrologic services, probably because water is abundant in the 
region. 
  
The Brazilian government has launched the Proambiente program, in which payments are used to 
promote environmental sustainability in the Amazon. Groups of farmers are contracted to follow land-use 
plans that feature restrictions (e.g., no clear-cutting or burning); however, specific environmental services 
are ill targeted. In return, they receive payments from the central government. The program was led by 
movements representing the rural poor, rather than created to satisfy specific demands for environmental 
services. Thus, it currently faces severe financing constraints, threatening its continuation.  
 
In other parts of Brazil, carbon initiatives have been implemented. For instance, the Plantar project, 
financed by the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund, aims to provide economic incentives for 
sustainable wood supplies for pig iron production in Minas Gerais state (May et al., 2004). Several cities 
in the southern part of the country have shown interest in PES or PES-like schemes for the sake of 
watershed conservation. One of these is the Ecological Value Added Tax (VAT), implemented first in 
Paraná and later in other states (Grieg-Gran, 2000; May et al., 2002). There are fairly advanced emerging 
initiatives in the uplands of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and Vitória (Espírito Santo state).  
 
Central America and Mexico. Mexico’s Program for Hydrologic-Environmental Services (PSA-H) is 
the largest PES program in Latin America. The PSA-H focuses on the conservation of threatened natural 
forests for the sake of maintaining the flow and quality of water. This emphasis reflects mounting water 
scarcity in Mexico as well as elevated deforestation in many parts of the country (Muñoz-Piña et al., 
forthcoming). Funding for the PSA-H grew from $18 million in 2003 to $30 million in 2004, derived 
from charges paid by federal water users. Consistent with the program’s basic purpose, monies are 
disbursed to individual and collective landowners possessing natural forests that serve watershed 
functions. Payments for preservation of cloud forests ($40 per hectare annually) exceed those for other 
tree-covered land ($30 per hectare annually).  
 
PES implementation is most advanced in Costa Rica and is highlighted by its Payments for 
Environmental Services (PSA) program, established in 1997. Forest Law 7575 (1996) established four 
primary purposes for the PSA program: (1) mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions; (2) hydrologic 
services, including provision of water for human consumption, irrigation, and energy production; (3) 
biodiversity conservation; and (4) protection of scenic beauty for recreation and ecotourism. The same 
law established a regulatory framework for contracting with landowners for the provision of these 
services. It also established the semi-autonomous National Fund for Forest Financing (FONAFIFO) to 
manage the PSA. 
 
To participate in the PSA program, landowners submit a plan for sustainable forest management, prepared 
by a licensed forester. Once this plan is approved, specified practices (i.e., timber plantation, forest 
conservation or forest management) must be adopted, which triggers payments. In 2006, annual payments 
for forest conservation averaged $64 per hectare. For forest plantations, about $816 per hectare are 
disbursed over a 10-year period. Recently, payments for agroforestry were added. Although an initial 
disbursement can be requested on contract signing, all subsequent annual payments require verification of 
compliance. 
 
To date, the PSA program has been funded primarily with revenues from a national tax on fossil fuels, 
which averages about $10 million annually. Additional support has included two grants from the Global 
Environment Facility, a World Bank loan, and a grant from German aid agency KFW. In 2005, a new 
water tariff came into effect, which increased PSA revenues. In addition, new opportunities exist thanks 
to forest carbon finance. 
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Obstacles to PES in Latin America. Two principal factors are believed to be limiting watershed PES in 
Latin America: uncertain benefits and high costs. Since PES programs were first proposed, doubts have 
been expressed about their environmental benefits. One criticism is that natural variability in 
environmental parameters may outweigh the measurable impact of land management changes over the 
short term (five to 10 years). Furthermore, there is considerable scientific uncertainty over the 
relationships between land management and environmental impacts. 
 
One reason for this is revealed by an analysis of Ecuadorian laws relating to PES. Virtually all these legal 
arrangements focus on the central government’s ownership of biodiversity and other resources, obviously 
anticipating sizable international payments for access to these environmental assets. In contrast, existing 
laws and regulations are silent on the support that the national state should provide to local PES schemes 
(Corral and Rodríguez, 2006). As a result, the use of PES in watershed conservation remains excessively 
expensive, therefore is not resorted to as often as it could or should be. 
 
Latin America summary and conclusions. Currently, most relevant operations in Latin America, as 
elsewhere in the developing world, are PES-like, i.e., not full-fledged examples of the approach. But the 
number of ongoing and emerging initiatives is much larger than in Africa and Asia combined. Many 
watershed schemes have failed to cultivate buyers of environmental services, relying instead on one-off 
contributions from external donors. Others do not feature conditionality, with implementing agencies 
shying away from the business-like practice of paying only when services are rendered. This reluctance 
has to do in part with concerns about disrupting relationships with poor farmers, which suggests that PES 
development and the alleviation of rural poverty may not be entirely harmonious. 
 
Various things can be done to increase the use of conservation payments. Greater scientific understanding 
of key hydrologic linkages (e.g., sediment displacement due to natural and human forces) would help. So 
would the counteraction of strategic behavior through the use of innovative bidding procedures as well as 
the development of institutional arrangements conducive to collective action. Government policies, such 
as selling water below its cost, need to be reformed. At the same time, the public sector needs to help 
reduce scale-dependent transaction costs, which are especially burdensome for small communities and 
which counter the capture of society-wide benefits (e.g., biodiversity protection) created by watershed 
protection at the local level. 
 
Beyond coming to terms with specific tasks such as these, one must bear in mind broader reasons why 
there is often a gap between what PES theorists have imagined in scientific articles and the reality of PES 
on the ground. One of these is that Latin Americans historically have made use of the natural environment 
for free – logging, mining, and expanding the agricultural frontier pretty much as they pleased. In light of 
this history, actually paying for environmental services in response to mounting resource scarcity 
represents a major change in attitude, which necessarily will take time. 
 
Also, PES implementation is held back in many places because of mistrust by key stakeholders. For 
example, service-providers – most notably, small indigenous farmers – fear that PES represents a first 
step toward permanent expropriation of their resources. At the same time, service-users might suspect that 
they are or will be the victims of “environmental blackmail.” Intermediaries, including NGOs and civil-
society elements, sometimes have the confidence of stakeholders needed to overcome perceptional 
obstacles such as these. The presence of such fair brokers between users and providers of environmental 
services often catalyzes early PES initiatives, which in turn can lead to scaled-up programs such as the 
Costa Rican PSA or the Mexican PSA-H. Aside from being trustworthy, these intermediaries also need to 
be willing to invest the time and effort required for effective negotiations. 
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As such negotiations are pursued, there is no reason to insist always on one-size-fits-all when applying 
economic incentives in environmental management, with conditionality and all other features of PES in 
place everywhere. But while customizing schemes to local conditions may be entirely sensible, we are 
convinced that payment-initiatives in a number of settings would be more effective if these adhered more 
closely to all five PES principles. For example, when watershed PES schemes rely exclusively on external 
sources of support (instead of service-user payments) that will decline sooner or later, then they are bound 
to be unsustainable. Also, when there is no strong conditionality, service delivery is compromised in most 
cases. Following a complete set of guiding PES principles, then, is not just a question of academic grace. 
Instead, doing so directly affects the functionality of conservation payments. 
 
Payments for watershed services in Asia 
 
Across much of Asia, rapid transitions to market-based economies alongside demographic changes are 
creating an increasingly high demand for watershed services. Standard approaches to watershed 
management have largely failed to reverse widespread watershed degradation and protect the watershed 
services they provide. The past few years have witnessed a surge of interest in the development of PES 
programs in Asia. A number of donor-driven scoping assessments and action research pilot sites are 
underway – primarily in Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Nepal, Vietnam, and China – to determine the 
enabling conditions for establishing PES schemes. The largest number of PES and/or PES-like case 
studies comes from Indonesia and the Philippines, where watershed management has taken on less of a 
command and control approach, thus the enabling conditions for establishing PES schemes are greater. 
Donor-driven poverty alleviation is also being tested as an objective alongside the provision of 
environmental services. Few “mature” PES programs actually exist in Asia.  
 
Five factors influencing the development of PES programs in Asia are discussed. First, governance 
structures in Asian countries vary from command-and-control to more decentralized, participatory 
approaches to watershed management. Such governance structures shape the regulations and the required 
capacities of local and national-level institutions to support PES. Second, in much of Asia, population 
density is high and land holdings per household are relatively low, potentially increasing PES transaction 
costs. Third, most forest and agricultural land in Asia is state-controlled, with individuals or communities 
possessing weak property or usufruct rights, thus bringing into question the voluntary component of the 
PES definition. Fourth, as within most developing countries, the lack of hydrologic data to establish a 
relationship between land-use patterns and environmental services raises issues of how the conditionality 
aspect of PES is being met. Finally, the level of awareness of the PES concept across Asia is relatively 
low.  
 
Design and development of PES in Asia. With funding from the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) has played a prominent role in promoting 
the concept of both cash and in-kind “rewards” for environmental services with their Rewarding Upland 
Poor for the Environmental Services (RUPES) program in Asia. RUPES is actively implementing pilot 
action sites in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Nepal, and establishing learning sites in China and other 
parts of Asia to test the feasibility of PES to address both environmental protection and poverty 
alleviation. Also, from 2001 to 2006, IIED conducted scoping assessments in India and Indonesia. With 
funding primarily from external donors such as Great Britain’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), USAID, and the Ford Foundation, a number of international and local organizations are also 
exploring the feasibility of PES programs in Asia. 
 
Improved total water yield and seasonal flow augmentation; improved quality of water; and general 
watershed rehabilitation and erosion control are the most commonly reported hydrologic environmental 
services demanded and provided under PES programs in Asia. Landslide prevention and flood control are 
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also mentioned as possible services, but no related PES cases were found. While environmental services 
demanded are based purely on downstream watershed service needs, the actual PES mechanism adopted 
and whether the schemes fit the five requirements of the PES definition are factors of whether market 
mechanisms are at work or state regulations are driving watershed management approaches, or a 
combination of both. In China, providers of environmental services, such as farmers, can opt to 
participate in the Sloping Farming Lands Conversion Program PES scheme, but the government finances 
the program, specifies how the land is to be managed, and farmer participation has not always been 
voluntary (Sun and Liqiao, 2006). In contrast, in India and Indonesia, individual households or 
communities participate in decision-making processes to determine how land is managed to provide an 
environmental service, which is more characteristic of market-based PES programs (Landell-Mills and 
Porras, 2002).  
 
PES buyers in Asia have included a mix of local and national downstream users:  
 
• State-owned or parastatal hydroelectric facilities or municipal water supply companies directly or 
indirectly providing cash payments or in-kind rewards to upland communities in return for the 
provision of reliable water flows and improved water quality, typically reduced sedimentation or 
erosion (Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines); 
• Private enterprises, such as local water bottling or ecotourism companies, agreeing to pay upstream 
land users by direct or indirect cash payments or in-kind rewards for the provision of improved water 
quality or quantity (Indonesia); 
• Local community groups, such as water user associations, agreeing to pay upstream users by direct or 
indirect cash payments or in-kind rewards for the provision of improved water quality or quantity 
(India); and 
• Central governments distributing cash subsidies and in-kind rewards to farmers in return for reduced 
sedimentation or erosion (China).  
 
By far, municipal water utilities, national and local governments, and hydroelectric facilities are the 
predominant buyers in the case studies reviewed. Cases of private sector interest (e.g., private bottling 
companies) in payment for environmental services exist but are not common. In most cases, there is a 
single buyer.  
 
Overall, there is limited demand from environmental service buyers in Asia, for the general concept is 
relatively new and potential buyers are not aware of the potential. Furthermore, there are few if any 
successfully implemented PWS cases; thus, potential PWS buyers are uncertain if payments will provide 
desired environmental services. Buyers may also require more evidence of scientific linkages between 
upland land-use management and downstream impacts before committing. Where buyers are already 
paying various taxes to the national and local government and/or putting funds aside for community 
development activities aimed at social responsibility, PES is also perceived by some as another 
unwelcome tax or fee.  
 
Potential service providers are not homogenous across the Asian landscape. In particular, individual 
farmers may have limited land-use ownership or rights (private, community-owned, state-owned) or be 
altogether landless. The widespread lack of land tenure is often cited as a key constraint to PES in Asia 
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Wunder et al., 2005). As a result, some PES action pilot sites in Asia are 
experimenting with land tenure or land-use rights as a payment or reward for environmental services 
(Winrock International, 2005; Suyanto et al., 2005; Leimona, 2005). 
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Population density and resulting small land holdings in Asia require a high level of cooperation and 
coordination among land users to secure desired watershed services. Smallholders also typically tend to 
be poor and are at a distinct disadvantage if a capable or trustworthy intermediary is absent to advocate on 
their behalf. In India, watershed development program benefits often go disproportionately to rich 
landowners rather than the poor (Sengputa et al., 2003), because the poor are less familiar with formal 
contracts; are poorly educated; and, due to weak property rights, are unable to guarantee that they will be 
able to provide watershed services (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). Evidence also suggests that in some 
circumstances, marginalized community members and landless farmers could lose access to common 
areas and experience declining livelihoods unless poverty alleviation is considered in program design. 
Thus, group-based rewards, such as tenure security for the whole, can potentially improve 
coordination/cooperation and prevent the poor and weak from being manipulated or expropriated by 
wealthier members of the group. In fact, in most if not all cases, environmental service providers are ad 
hoc or formal groups of individuals such as association of water users, farmers, and forestry operators. 
  
Intermediaries – local and international NGOs, research institutes, community-based organizations, and 
government officials at various levels – play a critical role in linking the providers and the buyers of the 
environmental services. In Asia, intermediaries provide a range of services: increasing public awareness, 
serving as a clearinghouse for information, training, capacity building, negotiating, monitoring and 
evaluation, resolving conflicts, absorbing transaction costs, and conducting scientific and socioeconomic 
feasibility assessments on the potential of PES in various watersheds. Intermediaries have also helped to 
generate collective action, providing support for weaker members of communities to better address 
poverty alleviation or ensure that the poor are not made worse off. Local institutional capacity to provide 
such services varies across Asia but is generally low. Without intermediaries, the potential of PES at 
many of these sites in Asia would probably not be realized, at least in the short term.  
 
Developing payment mechanisms with the right incentives to induce long-term behavior change has 
proved a challenge in the Asian context as elsewhere. The appropriate length of contract, type of 
payments or rewards, fee structures and targeting, and transaction costs area all factors in determining the 
incentive package needed to convince potential providers and sellers of environmental services of the 
benefits from active participation in PES programs. 
  
Typically, contracts between buyers and sellers are initially negotiated for a couple of years with the 
potential to be renegotiated and extended if a demand still exists once the contract period ends. In China, 
under the Sloping Farming Lands Conversion Program, contracts to convert farming and barren lands are 
recognized for up to 50 years, can be inherited and transferred, and can be extended on expiration. 
Farmers voluntarily convert marginal, sloping farmlands into forests and grasslands in exchange for cash 
subsidies and/or free grain or seedlings (Sun and Liqiao, 2006). More typical are shorter contracts, such 
as in the Cidanau watershed in Indonesia, where the company PT Krakatau Tirta Industri (KTI) is 
voluntarily paying upland communities to maintain forest cover on a 50 hectare pilot site for two years 
with the possibility to renegotiate and extend for another five years (Leimona and Prihatno, 2005).  
 
Where awareness of PES exists, Asian upland communities have participated in PES schemes for cash 
payments. Such payments typically flow to a group with established rules, written or oral, on how to 
manage PES payments/community funds for the benefit of the whole. Rarely if ever is cash transferred 
directly to individual households.  
 
Several RUPES sites found that royalty distributions per capita for water supply services from 
hydropower plants were insufficient to affect poverty. For example, in Singkarak Lake, Indonesia, the 
local community unit received close to $40,000, or only $1 per capita, in 2005 as its first allocation of 
hydropower royalties (ICRAF, site profile RUPES Singkarak). Similarly, in the Kulekhani watershed in 
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Nepal, payments from hydropower royalties amounted to about $1.50 per capita (ICRAF, site profile 
RUPES Kulekhani).  
 
Yet local communities do appear to benefit where cash payments are complemented with in-kind rewards 
such as secure access to land for farming, technical assistance or training, with the potential to lead to 
additional incomes and benefits.  In Vietnam, for instance, the average smallholder farmer received an 
average annual payment from a pilot PES scheme of $15, making up only 2% of household income. This 
low payment was attributed to the inability of poor farmers to commit more than 1.5 hectares to the 
scheme. However, the farmers were willing to participate in the scheme because many were seasonally 
unemployed, and they valued the forest management training and technical assistance provided (Bui and 
Hong, 2006). Thus, in designing PES programs, it would appear that some form of layering of payments 
or rewards is necessary to create an attractive incentive package.  
 
The literature indicates that targeting is not commonly used to direct payments to service providers giving 
the greatest environmental service benefits. Rather, evidence points to cash being paid mostly as flat fees 
or flat fees per hectare. While implementing flat fees per hectare is easier to implement, it may be less 
efficient in achieving desired environmental services. Experiments with differentiated fees based on the 
level of services provided are few. In one case, in Sumberjaya, Indonesia, a payment scheme is being 
explored whereby a hydropower facility in Sumberjaya makes payments at different levels based on 
actual sediment reductions achieved by watershed protection activities (ICRAF, RUPES Sumberjaya). 
This is an exception, for few Asian PES activities have performance-based monitoring and evaluation 
components to determine if the intended environmental service is being supplied, in large part due to the 
lack of scientific data and knowledge linking upland activities with downstream impacts. 
 
Similarly, few socioeconomic poverty indicators are being collected to determine if the poor are 
benefiting from PES schemes. As a start, the RUPES program has recently prepared baseline indicators to 
monitor the impact of PES on poverty alleviation in its six pilot sites in Indonesia, Nepal, and the 
Philippines. However, because poverty is so pervasive in upland areas, the poor may be service providers 
and thus receive payments or rewards under a PES scheme by default.  
 
Transaction costs are those required to establish and manage a PES program. Such costs can be high 
where the negotiation process is long; the process of distributing payments is bureaucratic; hydrological 
data is missing for monitoring purposes; and awareness is low, among other factors. In most of Asia, the 
capacity of existing local institutions to confront and resolve these challenges is considerably low, thus 
potentially raising the transaction costs needed to increase capacity. In the few cases that mention 
transaction costs, evidence indicates that they could hinder PES program success. For instance, one study 
found that the estimated transaction cost to establish and operate a land tenure rights (HKm) group in 
Sumberjaya, Indonesia, was about $55 per household. Such costs include covering the time and effort 
needed to negotiate or prepare, process, and approve the HKm applications submitted to the local and 
national governments. Given that the average annual farm household income is $109 or less, this 
transaction cost was considered excessive (Arifin, 2005). Transaction costs can be lowered if payments 
are distributed to organizations rather than individual households, particularly where the people-to-land-
area ratio is high, as is widely the case in Asia.  
 
No country in Asia now has laws and policies at the national level explicitly and directly supporting PES. 
Opinions concerning the necessity of PES-enabling laws and policies range from the belief that existing 
national and local policies are adequate or need only minor modifications to support PES to the belief that 
entirely new PES-enabling legislation is needed (Padilla et al., 2005; Arifin, 2005). Across Asia, a 
number of key policies already address ecosystem conservation and protection, revenue generation, and 
poverty alleviation, providing indirect support to the objectives of PES. However, current legislation does 
10 
 
not specifically require that funds be earmarked directly to service providers or that beneficiaries pay for 
environmental services.  
 
Summary and conclusions. Asian countries are at different stages in exploring the potential of PES 
programs to provide environmental services. Indonesia and the Philippines have the largest number of 
documented PES activities, but all of these are still in the testing/pilot program stage. Consequently, only 
preliminary lessons learned and best practices are available. Key questions in Asia include whether the 
definition of PES can be broadened to include both environmental service and poverty alleviation goals, 
and whether PES can exist where governments exercise tight control over land use, as in much of China 
and Vietnam.  
 
While broader contextual factors, e.g., forms of governance and high population densities, affect the 
design and implementation of PES schemes in Asia, their feasibility is highly specific to local context. 
Preliminary evidence indicates that where feasible, PES schemes have the potential to be designed from 
the start to ensure a higher likelihood of success in Asia.  
 
Payments for watershed services in Africa 
 
Although there has been global experimentation with PWS schemes for almost a decade, only a couple 
exist in Africa. The two African PWS programs now making payments are both in South Africa. As 
described below, these two programs are not conventional PES programs; they are essentially public 
works programs oriented towards securing hydrologic services. Given that the most common definitions 
of PES services do not include such public works programs (e.g., Wunder, 2007; Ferraro, 2001), one 
could reasonably argue that there are no PWS schemes now operating in Africa. In addition to the two 
programs in South Africa, there are at least eight other initiatives in formal planning phases in South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Kenya. Presentations at recent workshops (e.g., East and Southern Africa 
Katoomba Group, 2006) suggest that other initiatives are being considered by field practitioners and 
government agencies, but these have not yet entered a formal planning phase. 
  
For all types of PES, Africa lags other areas of the world. For example, in the global carbon offset market 
for 2003 and 2004, Latin America and Asia accounted for more than three-fourths of the emissions 
reduction projects, while Africa accounted for just 3% (Lecocq and Capoor, 2005). The Katoomba Group 
commissioned PES inventories for Uganda (Ruhweza and Masiga, 2006), Kenya (Mutunga and Mwangi, 
2006), Tanzania (Scurrah-Ehrhart 2006) and South Africa (King, Damon, and Forsyth, 2005). These 
inventories list 18 biodiversity projects (of which two are making payments in cash or in kind), 17 carbon 
projects (of which five are making payments), and 10 water projects (of which two are making payments). 
Jindal (2006) lists another 13 nations with carbon sequestration programs, but none of them has more than 
one project (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda together have seven). A couple of nations have biodiversity 
payment initiatives (Madagascar, Guinea). However, no other payments for water service initiatives were 
identified. Bond (2006) reported that PWS schemes were proposed but abandoned in Zimbabwe and 
Malawi.  
 
The inventories’ definition of what a payment for biodiversity project comprises in Africa includes 
community-based natural resource management initiatives, ecotourism market participation (e.g., as 
guides or other tourist service providers), agricultural technology transfer projects, and projects that 
reward communities with limited access to protected areas. A minority of the listed projects are 
conditional (performance-based). The Kenyan inventory lists 10 PES projects (one water, one carbon, 
eight biodiversity) but has a disclaimer: “The projects show elements of PES but may not necessarily 
exhibit explicit characteristics of the buyer-seller model.” A recent workshop, Catalyzing Payments for 
Ecosystem Services in Africa, further illustrates the paucity of initiatives (East and Southern Africa 
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Katoomba Group, 2006). Of the eight African case studies presented, only one referenced an ongoing 
PES project.  
 
Most African PES initiatives are funded through overseas development assistance, international 
conservation organizations and, increasingly, governmental agencies. There is little private-sector 
involvement. A common refrain at African PES meetings is that somehow conservation and development 
practitioners must “engage the private sector,” which currently is unaware of the substantial purported 
gains from trade in environmental service contract schemes.  
 
Why so few PWS schemes in Africa? Africa is the most capital-poor, inhabited continent. Thus, not 
surprisingly, most of its rural populations depend on ecosystem services for their livelihoods. Sub-
Saharan Africa includes 11 of the 16 nations of the world having less than 1,000 cubic meters of water per 
person annually, a situation described as “absolute water scarcity” where food shortages are a constant 
threat and water shortage can only increase (FAO, 1995). With water so scarce, why are there so few 
PWS programs in Africa? Frequently cited obstacles to their development there and elsewhere are lack of 
technical and market information, limited institutional experience, inadequate legal framework, limited 
successful business models, suspicion of markets for public goods, and equity concerns. Other reasons for 
reduced PWS activity in Africa are described below. 
 
In general, PWS come from five sources: hydroelectric power suppliers, large industrial users, municipal 
water suppliers, irrigation water users, and general tax revenues. It is worth mentioning that in most PWS 
cases in the world, existing revenue streams are being used to make the conservation payments. In only a 
few cases have rates paid by end-users been raised. Thus the financial health of institutions is an 
important prerequisite for PWS schemes, a quality for which African institutions are not well known. 
 
Africa generates little electricity by hydropower compared with other regions of the world –less than 20% 
comes from hydroelectric sources (Lokolo, 2004; United Nations, 2004). In contrast, almost 70% of Latin 
America’s substantially greater electricity production comes from hydroelectric sources (United Nations, 
2004). Unlike Latin America and parts of Asia, Africa does not have high hydroelectric potential because 
so much of the continent has a semiarid climate with periodic droughts. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
hydroelectric potential of 710 Terawatt hours (TWh), of which 6% was developed in the 1990s. Latin 
America, in contrast, has 3,280 TWh of potential, of which 12% was developed. The hydroelectric 
capability of Africa is mainly in its most institutionally weak nations: Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Madagascar (Lokolo, 2004). Moreover, in terms of potential numbers of payers, 
Latin America has the highest electricity coverage (84%) of any region in the developing world, whereas 
Africa has the lowest (about 10%). 
 
As with hydroelectric power, Africa also has the fewest public water systems and the fewest citizens 
connected to them. Thus there are fewer people who can be charged for domestic water. Most Latin 
American nations have higher rates of urban access to piped water and, more importantly, much higher 
rates of urbanization. About three-fourths of the Latin American population is urban. In contrast, only 
35% of Africa’s population is urban (UNDP, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, investing in watershed management is not an obvious priority for African municipal water 
supply systems. Urban water systems are caught in a cycle of declines in investment, quality of service, 
and financial returns, characterized by (a) low coverage and unreliable service, (b) high levels of 
unaccounted-for water and unpaid bills, (c) poor financial management, (d) revenues insufficient to cover 
operations and maintenance costs, and (e) inadequate commercial management (World Bank, 2001; 
2004).  
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Industrial water users are self-supplied industries not connected to a distribution network. 
Industrialization is certainly much lower in Africa than in other areas of the world, thus the likelihood of 
using funds from industrial water users is less. 
 
The final institutional source of PWS financing is general tax revenues, which are much less than in other 
parts of the world. For example, compared with Latin America, Africa has smaller government budgets 
(just over half), larger populations (almost double), higher levels of poverty (more than three times 
higher), and higher rates of government expenditures expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP), despite the African GDP being much lower. All of these observations imply that Africa has much 
less capacity than Latin America for drawing on tax revenues to fund PWS programs.  
 
Getting African water users to pay for hydrologic services is made difficult by high levels of poverty. 
Thirty-four of the 49 least developed countries are African (FAO, 2005). On the other hand, poverty also 
makes the required payments for PWS lower in Africa than in other parts of the world, for African 
suppliers’ opportunity costs are lower. However, the high-profile development goal to increase Africans’ 
access to safe drinking water makes it politically more difficult to insist that water users pay a higher fee. 
Even in South Africa, where the percentage of the population with access to safe water is relatively high 
by African standards, restricting water access to non-payers is controversial. Because water is a larger 
portion of their budget, poor residents likely have a much higher price elasticity of demand for water than 
non-poor residents. 
 
High transaction costs are also barriers to PES development in Africa (Muramira, 2005; Grieg-Gran et al., 
2006; Ochieng et al., 2007). Although transaction costs are a problem in all nations (Bellagio Group, 
2007), there are reasons to believe that PWS schemes in Africa may be particularly affected by such 
costs.  
 
Land ownership is much more concentrated in Latin America than in Africa (Lastarria-Cornhiel et al., 
1999). Thus in Latin America, PWS schemes are more likely to contract with a smaller number of large 
landowners, whereas in Africa, they must contract with many small land users/owners. Note that the less 
concentrated distribution of land in Africa also implies that, should a PWS be feasible, it is more likely to 
be pro-poor than in Latin America. A PWS scheme is a contract, thus the factors typically identified as 
curtailing business activity apply to PWS development: regulatory environment, rates of literacy, judicial 
system, availability of information, trust, and corruption. This is an issue because 25 of the 64 most 
corrupt nations in the world (Transparency International, 2006) are in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The African land tenure situation is an important barrier to PES development (e.g., Muramira, 2005; 
Mwangi and Mutunga, 2005; Ochieng et al., 2007). A review of global tenure trends (Lastarria-Cornhiel 
et al., 1999) indicated that most land in Africa is held under customary tenure that provides access to all 
recognized members of the community. Thus, PWS schemes in Africa frequently must address multiple 
sources of formal and informal authority over a given tract.  
 
Customary tenure systems in Africa generally do not permit land sales, particularly to people outside the 
community. Even leasing can be complicated by tenure insecurity (i.e., someone leasing land could gain 
rights over it), which makes rental rates higher than they normally would be (Lastarria-Cornhiel et al., 
1999). Thus PWS programs, which typically contract for actions that curtail access and use to land, may 
be more difficult in Africa.  
 
Given the likelihood of multiple property claims, payments in Africa are more likely to be at the 
community level than the household level. Although there are examples of community-based revenue 
sharing schemes (e.g., CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe) and community-based PES (e.g., Nhambita 
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Community Carbon Project in Mozambique), not all African nations recognize customary tenure or 
communities (villages, village councils) as autonomous legal entities, particularly when the property in 
question is “wild” forests or wetlands. Even when such tenure systems and local institutions are 
recognized, designing a community-based contract that induces the required individual behaviors is much 
more difficult than in situations involving single owners with secure property rights. 
 
Reports on PES related to Africa (Waage et al., 2005; Muramira, 2005; Mwangi and Mutunga, 2005; 
Scurrah-Ehrhart, 2006) argue that a key constraint is the lack of enabling legal, regulatory, and 
administration elements. Nations in which there is some PES activity (Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa) 
have some enabling legislation (Ruhweza and Muhumure, 2005).  
 
In some cases, there may be legislation that explicitly forbids PWS-related activity. For example, South 
Africa’s National Water Act prohibits some activities for which someone might want to make a payment, 
such as removal of vegetation from a riparian zone or stopping agriculture in a riparian zone (King et al., 
2005). In other cases, authority over water and land use may be too decentralized to allow for effective 
coordination across a catchment (e.g., if water users’ associations are defined at the sub-catchment level).  
 
However, no clear case for the lack of enabling legislation being an important barrier to PWS 
development has been made. In many African nations, there is legislation for channeling user fees (called 
abstraction fees) to watershed management. There may be weaknesses in the systems (Scurrah-Ehrhart, 
2006) and an unwillingness to charge such fees, but the authority to do so exists in many African nations. 
Indeed, the summary of the East African and South African PES inventories (Katoomba Group, 2006) 
identifies the lack of supporting legislation as a barrier but notes that “in most countries, policies 
establishing the right to buy and sell ecosystem stewardship services have not been essential for pilot 
activity in PES.”  
 
A report summarizing PES inventories for East Africa and South Africa (Katoomba Group, 2006) 
reported that most African countries lacked needed institutional capacity (e.g., certification bodies, 
financial intermediaries, national registries for ecosystem services, water management agencies, technical 
capacity) to facilitate PES, and this increases transaction costs. 
 
Lack of awareness of PES and the capacity to design and implement PES schemes have also been 
identified as critical barriers to PES development in Africa (Muramira, 2005; Mwangi and Mutunga, 
2005; Katoomba Group, 2006; Ochieng et al., 2006). The concept of PWS schemes is relatively new and, 
given the constraints on information transmission in Africa, one would expect PWS development to be 
slower than in other parts of the world.  
 
PWS insights from South Africa. Given the barriers to the development of PWS listed above, it should 
come as no surprise that the majority of African PWS activity is taking place in South Africa. Relative to 
the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has a better business climate, higher income levels, greater 
scientific capacity, better understanding of the nation’s hydrology, greater institutional capacity, a 
stronger national water law that makes provision for the use of economic instruments in water 
management (Act No. 36 of 1998), and higher rates of access to safe water.  
 
In its two operational PWS programs – Working for Water and Working for Wetlands – South Africa has 
managed to address the imperative of assisting the poor and circumvent the problems that arise from 
complex tenure systems. They have done so by adopting a public works program approach that allows 
targeting of benefits to the disadvantaged and avoids contracting with land users (i.e., focuses on 
government lands). This approach also leads to broad national support for the programs. Moreover, the 
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contracts in these programs are for activities for which compliance is relatively easy to monitor (removing 
invasive plant species on a plot of land or rehabilitating a wetland). 
 
Summary and conclusions. The paucity of on-the-ground PWS initiatives precludes a definitive 
discussion of an African PWS model or regional PWS trends in Africa. Nevertheless, there are some 
common elements of existing and proposed African PWS initiatives. First, and most importantly, poverty 
alleviation and equitable wealth distribution are key objectives in most African PWS projects. In Africa, 
poverty alleviation and services are viewed as equally valued joint products of PWS schemes, or the 
provision of watershed services is viewed as merely a co-benefit of the poverty alleviation scheme (e.g., 
Working for Water Program). The implied social targeting that comes with a focus on poverty alleviation 
will likely increase the transaction costs and decrease the level of watershed services provided by PWS in 
Africa. The appeal of a PWS scheme that provides employment benefits may explain the African interest 
in the potential role of PES to restore degraded ecosystems (Ruhweza and Muhumure, 2005). 
 
The two existing PWS programs in South Africa depend on general tax revenues for financing. The 
choice of such financing stems from a strong program emphasis on economic empowerment and poverty 
alleviation rather than ecosystem services, and from the political controversy associated with raising 
water prices in a poor nation. The planned programs in Africa are hopeful for financing from water users, 
but none have secured such a funding source. South Africa’s WfW program shows that the dichotomy 
some PWS proponents make between public payment schemes and self-organized private deals is not a 
strict one: The government can maintain an institutional infrastructure through which individual 
beneficiaries of ecosystem services (e.g., private companies) can make their payments to service 
suppliers.  
 
Another argument frequently made in the PES gray literature and presentations is that tax-financed PWS 
programs are inherently less cost-effective than private payment programs. However, given that most 
water and hydroelectricity suppliers in Africa are government-run or regulated private entities, there is no 
reason to believe they will be any more cost-effective. Even when the buyer is a private enterprise, the 
fact that many such entities engage in these deals for reasons of corporate social responsibility and 
reputation also suggests that they may be no more cost-effective than tax-financed initiatives.   
 
In conclusion, for all of the reasons discussed above, there will likely be fewer PWS schemes in Africa 
than elsewhere. However, these barriers to PWS development do not imply there are no opportunities for 
PWS. There are already a couple of large-scale initiatives and a number of incipient initiatives that may 
succeed in establishing PWS schemes. Further experimentation and information-sharing over the next 
five years should offer a clearer picture of the potential for PWS to achieve environmental and social 
objectives on the African continent. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
Payments for watershed services and PES programs in general are being promoted as an alternative to 
standard conservation programs in some circumstances. The hope with PES is that it will provide new 
revenue streams for protection of environmental services and that, through the use of market mechanisms, 
it will be more effective in achieving environmental goals. True PES programs as defined by the PES 
researchers involve:  
 
1) A well-defined environmental service or a suitable proxy for this service;  
2) At least one buyer of this service or proxy;  
3) At least one seller;  
4) Voluntary transactions between buyer(s) and seller(s); and 
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5) Payments conditional on contracted environmental services or proxies for same actually being 
supplied. 
  
Also, poverty alleviation is commonly added as an objective by many development practitioners.  PWS 
and PES programs featuring all five PES characteristics are exceedingly rare in the developing world.  
Most PES activities reviewed were actually proposals or scoping/research studies, and a significant 
number of proposed PES schemes had been abandoned, although new proposals have correspondingly 
emerged. Most PES programs reviewed did not satisfy all five PES criteria. Poverty alleviation was often 
an additional stated goal. PWS and PES programs are the most advanced in Latin America and the least 
advanced in Africa, which has only two watershed service programs with PES-like elements. Identified 
factors that tended to promote successful PES programs included secure land tenure; technical capacity to 
design and manage programs, including layering financial and non-financial incentives;  the presence of 
fair brokers acting as intermediaries between buyers and sellers; higher standards of living; countries with 
high urban populations and a need for improved water resources; countries in which commercializing 
rights to land management is culturally and politically acceptable; countries with PES-enabling 
legislation; and countries with good governance. These factors are generally most positive in Latin 
America and least positive in Africa.  
  
For more information on the state of PWS/PES in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the reader is referred 
to Ferraro (2007), Huang and Upadhyaya (2007), and Southgate and Wunder (2007), respectively. 
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